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ABSTRACT
In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca accuses Descartes of reasoning circularly 
in the Fourth Meditation. This alleged new circle is distinct from, and more vicious 
than, the traditional Cartesian Circle arising in the Third Meditation. We explain 
Della Rocca’s reasons for this accusation, showing that his argument is invalid.
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1. Introduction
In two recent papers, Michael Della Rocca locates a distinct instance of circular 
reasoning in Descartes’ Fourth Meditation – i.e. distinct from the traditional 
‘Cartesian Circle’ of the Third Meditation (2001, 2006). 1 This new circle, Della 
Rocca alleges, is an even more intractable fallacy: it is a bona fide instance 
of premise circularity in which the ‘truth rule’ (‘everything I clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive is true’) functions as a sub-premise in its own proof. While 
Della Rocca’s provocative reading has garnered substantial attention in the 
literature (see, e.g. Carriero 2009, 278–9, 462–3; Christofidou 2013; 245 n. 
10; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 98–100), it has not yet received the refutation it 
deserves. We supply that refutation here. We show that even granting Della 
Rocca’s interpretation of the Fourth Meditation, his charge of circularity is 
unwarranted.
2. The problem of meditation IV
Della Rocca begins his interpretation of the Fourth Meditation by noticing that 
it is structurally analogous to the Third Meditation. He writes,
© 2016 informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & francis Group
CONTACT Everett fulmer  efulmer@slu.edu
 
 
 
 
5
 
 
 
 
10
 
 
 
 
15
 
 
 
 
20
 
 
 
 
25
 
 
 
AQ1
RCJP 1223491 
24 August 2016
Initial CE: RK QA: AMColl:XX QC:XX
2  E. FulMER AND C.P. RAglAND
After [Descartes] lays ‘it down as a general rule’ near the beginning of Meditation 
III ‘that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true’ [AT VII 35, CSM II 24]2, 
Descartes immediately casts this rule into doubt by raising the possibility that god 
is a deceiver. So, too, after finally offering an argument later in Meditation III for 
the claim that god is not a deceiver, Descartes immediately goes on in Meditation 
IV to raise a doubt about this claim. (2006, 142–3, 2011, 94)
Descartes raises this worry about god’s non-deceptiveness in the following 
passage:
[S]ince god does not wish to deceive me, he surely did not give me the kind of 
faculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly. There 
would be no further doubt [dubium] on this issue were it not that what I have just 
said appears to imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong. For if everything 
that is in me comes from god, and he did not endow me with a faculty for making 
mistakes, it appears that I can never go wrong. (AT VII 54, CSM II 37–8)
Della Rocca glosses the problem here as follows:
But obviously, as Descartes recognizes, I do sometimes make mistakes, and so the 
argument for the claim that god is not a deceiver and that clear and distinct ideas 
are true is called into doubt. Descartes will not have removed this doubt and beaten 
back the skeptic about clear and distinct ideas until he has shown how it is com-
patible with god’s nondeceptiveness that we sometimes err. (2006, 143, 2011, 94)
To resolve this problem, Descartes must ‘answer the following question: How, 
if god is not a deceiver and thus does not allow clear and distinct ideas to be 
false, can god allow that I ever make mistakes, in particular with regard to ideas 
that are not clear and distinct?’ (2006, 143, 2011, 94). In other words, Descartes 
needs to show that while god’s veracity (‘god is not a deceiver’) entails the truth 
rule (‘clear and distinct ideas are true’), it does not entail human infallibility.3
Descartes blocks the inference to human infallibility with a ‘freewill defense’ 
that appeals to a distinction between ‘user-error’ and ‘manufacturer-error’4 along 
with a norm of correct assent. Descartes reasons that if we judge correctly and 
go wrong, then our faculty of judgment must have a design or manufacturing 
problem, for which god would be culpable. But if we ignore our manufacturer’s 
instructions for correct use – if the cause of error lies not in the faculties them-
selves but in our misuse of those faculties – then god is not to blame. Descartes 
thinks god has given us the following clear instruction for correctly using our 
faculty of judgment:
[I]t is clear by the natural light that the perception of the intellect should always 
precede the determination of the will. (AT VII 60, CSM II 41)
Della Rocca paraphrases this deliverance of the natural light as follows:
Norm of Assent (NA):  “[W]e should assent only to clear and distinct ideas”. 
(2006, 157)5
We are free to follow NA or to flout it. When we flout it, we place ourselves out-
side of the divine guarantee by using our faculties contrary to the manner god 
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intends. The result is a ‘user-error’ for which the ‘manufacturer’ of our faculties 
bears no responsibility. Thus, god’s goodness does not entail total infallibility, 
but only infallibility when we judge correctly.
3. The case for the new circle
Della Rocca’s circularity charge begins by asking Descartes to justify the norm 
of assent. Della Rocca asks: ‘Why, for Descartes, should we assent only to clear 
and distinct ideas? Without a good reason for this claim, Descartes will lack an 
effective way of putting to rest his doubt about clear and distinct ideas’ (2006, 
157). Della Rocca then contends that Descartes realized this need and attempted 
to justify NA in the following passage:
But if in such [non-clear and distinct] cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not 
using my free will correctly. If I go for the alternative which is false, then obviously 
I shall be in error; if I take the other side, then it is by pure chance that I arrive at 
the truth. (AT VII 59–60, CSM II 41)
According to Della Rocca, Descartes here affirms that we should not assent to 
non-clear-and-distinct perceptions because such judgments would be either 
false or ‘at best accidentally true’ (2006, 157). Conversely, clear and distinct ideas 
are neither false nor accidently true. From which it follows6 that clear and distinct 
ideas are true and guaranteed to be so. Thus, Della Rocca concludes:
The reason Descartes offers [to justify the norm of assent] seems to be ... [that] 
clear and distinct ideas are guaranteed to be true and non-clear and distinct are 
not. (2006, 157)
But offering this justification for NA is a fatal error. The truth rule, recall, says 
that all clear and distinct ideas are true. But here Descartes is appealing to an 
even stronger notion – not only are all clear and distinct ideas true, but they 
are guaranteed to be so and only they are so guaranteed. We will refer to this 
strengthened version of the truth rule as the
Super Truth Rule (STR):  “[o]nly clear and distinct ideas ... are guaranteed to be 
true”. (Della Rocca 2006, 157)
According to Della Rocca, Descartes derives NA from STR. But given the pur-
ported aim of Meditation IV, grounding the norm of assent in this way begs the 
question. As Della Rocca explains,
one of the premises needed for arguing that clear and distinct ideas are true is ... 
that we should assent only to clear and distinct ideas. This claim in turn requires 
argument, and the argument for it seems to be based on the claim that clear and 
distinct ideas are guaranteed to be true. So, one of the premises for the claim that 
clear and distinct ideas are true is that clear and distinct ideas are guaranteed to be 
true. Here the conclusion – indeed, a strengthened version of the conclusion – is 
itself a premise in the argument. (2006, 158–9)
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And therefore, Della Rocca concludes, Descartes is guilty of a particularly vicious 
form of circular reasoning in the Fourth Meditation: here, the truth rule is not 
just prematurely trusted – it is used as a premise to prove itself.
4. Our initial refutation
We begin with a fairly simple argument. Notice the structure of the problem 
Descartes faces: the goodness of god and the proof of the truth rule are called 
into question because god’s veracity (g) seems to entail the outlandish claim that 
humans are totally infallible (I). To solve this problem, Descartes merely needs 
to show that (I) does not follow from (g). And since (I) is inconsistent with the 
actuality of human error (E), showing that (g) does not entail (I) is equivalent to 
showing that the following set is consistent: {(g), (E)}.
Furthermore, demonstrating the consistency of a set of propositions only 
requires appeal to the logical relations that hold among the members of that 
set. It does not require any additional factual claims. That is to say, the entire 
discourse of such a project is non-committal about the truth of the notions it 
employs. Descartes need only invoke elements of his ‘freewill defense’ –  including 
NA and whatever grounds it – as hypotheses for the purposes of showing that 
(E) is consistent with (g). Even if Descartes does appeal to STR to ground NA, 
such an appeal does not commit him to the truth of STR. But, if Descartes does 
not need to endorse the truth of STR, then his use of STR does not presuppose 
the final conclusion of his argument – the truth rule. Thus, there is no circle.
5. An analogical rejoinder
In Della Rocca’s second paper (2011), he responds to something like this  objection: 
‘[o]ne might argue,’ he notes, that ‘all Descartes needs to do is to show that god’s 
veracity, and thus the guaranteed truth of clear and distinct ideas, is consistent 
with our occasional errors with regard to ideas that are not clear and distinct’ 
(99). However, he quickly retorts: ‘But again, the point is: How does Descartes 
show this consistency?’ (99). He does so, Della Rocca insists, by illegitimately and 
prematurely relying on the claim that clear and distinct ideas are guaranteed to 
be true. Della Rocca makes his point by way of the following analogy:
Imagine trying to reconcile one’s theory that Joe is the murderer with apparently 
conflicting DNA evidence that points to someone else, Susie. you reconcile these 
by claiming that the DNA evidence is misleading. But, let us say, your only basis 
for claiming that the DNA evidence is misleading is that Joe (and not Susie) is the 
murderer … In this case, you have not really defended your theory in light of the 
DNA evidence. What you need is a way of discounting the apparent counterevi-
dence, a way that is independent of the claim that Joe is the murderer … To avoid 
circularity, Descartes needs an independent way of reconciling occasional errors, 
on the one hand, with the guaranteed truth of clear and distinct ideas and god’s 
veracity, on the other. (2011, 99)
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Despite its intuitive pull, Della Rocca’s Joe and Susie analogy misrepresents 
Descartes’ dialectical situation. The analogy is based on the inductive, proba-
bilistic reasoning of courtrooms. If the attorney appeals to ‘Joe is the murderer’ 
in response to his opponent, he must assume the actual truth of that claim and 
so beg the question. But the same does not hold for Descartes since the prob-
lem Descartes faces is not inductive. What Descartes must overcome is that the 
reasoning that leads to the truth rule seems also to entail human infallibility (I). 
That is to say, there is a purported logically necessary connection between god’s 
veracity (g) and (I).7 Hence, Descartes’ dialectical situation differs considerably 
from the attorney seeking to prosecute Joe.
once one sees the switch of dialectical contexts, the analogy loses its force. 
given that Descartes must only demonstrate the logical consistency of the set 
{(g), (E)}, he must do no more than show (semantically speaking) that there 
is at least one logically possible truth value assignment that would make all 
statements of the set true. Descartes need not say anything about the actual 
truth values of the statements he invokes. And since the super truth rule is a 
logical possibility, there is nothing illegitimate about assuming it. Therefore, 
even if Descartes grounds NA on STR for the purposes of blocking the inference 
to (I), he does not beg the question thereby.
6. A modal rejoinder
Della Rocca has responded to our last line of reasoning by noting that on the 
most commonly used modal logic – System S5, which he believes Descartes 
would accept – the possibility of the super truth rule entails the actuality of the 
truth rule (2014).8 And thus even given our defense above, Descartes would still 
be guilty of circularity.
To see Della Rocca’s rejoinder, consider that the truth rule (TR) says that all clear 
and distinct ideas are true, and the super truth rule (STR) says that all (and only) 
clear and distinct ideas are guaranteed to be true (N.B. guaranteed =  necessary, 
for Della Rocca). Therefore, STR asserts the necessity of TR (TR). So, if Descartes 
assumes the mere possibility of the super truth rule, he thereby assumes:
   ◊TR
This means that at some accessible possible world – call it world 2 – the truth 
rule is necessarily true, i.e. (TR, w2) = T. Now, System S5 has Euclidean frame 
conditions, which entails that accessibility relations are symmetric. Thus, since 
world 1 (the actual world) accesses world 2, it follows that world 2 must also 
access world 1. And thus, since TR is true at world 2 it would follow by the 
valuation rule for ‘’ that TR is true at the actual world. So on System S5,
   ◊TR ⊢ TR
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Hence, Della Rocca concludes, even if Descartes merely assumes the super truth 
rule as a possibility, he thereby assumes the actual truth of the truth rule, and 
thus begs the question.
We wonder about attributing symmetric frame conditions to Descartes. 
With his creation doctrine of eternal truths, Descartes seems to posit two lev-
els of modal truths – absolute and restricted to creation – that do not access 
each other (see, e.g. [AT I 152, CSMK 25]; [AT V 224, CSMK 358–9]; and [AT IV 
118, CSMK 235]). And this would imply non-symmetric frame conditions.9 But 
even if we set that thorny issue aside, Della Rocca’s objection is still flawed in 
a more straightforward sense. With or without S5, the way in which Descartes 
must regard STR, for purposes of showing set consistency, is not accurately 
represented as a full-blooded modal commitment to possibility of STR in the 
actual world.
Notice that whether or not a set is consistent is wholly a matter of the terms 
that are already members of the set. Sets can be made inconsistent by the 
addition of new members, but inconsistent sets cannot be made consistent 
via addition. The set {p, ~p, q} will always remain inconsistent no matter how 
many terms are added. Thus, when Descartes demonstrates to the reader that 
error is consistent with his premises, he does not, and cannot, make the set 
consistent, if it is not already so. For Descartes to succeed, the set must already 
be consistent.
But if the set is already consistent, then what is Descartes doing with his story 
about our ability to flout the norm of assent? At least in terms of the project 
to ‘block’ the apparent entailment to (I), all such talk can only be pedagogical. 
Descartes is merely painting a conceptual backdrop that makes salient to the 
reader those aspects of the set {(g), (E)} that render it consistent.10 All features 
of such a hypothetical story can be fully disposed of once they achieve their 
purpose – i.e. once the reader sees that the set is consistent.
Moreover, the story Della Rocca attributes to Descartes (including STR) is 
not the only one available for this purpose. A story without STR could work just 
as well. For example, Descartes could say that humans are unable to withhold 
assent to clear and distinct perceptions, but are able to withhold it from non-
clear and distinct perceptions.11 given that ‘ought implies can,’ this difference in 
our abilities would explain why NA obliges us to withhold assent from non-clear 
and distinct ideas but not from clear and distinct ones. This alternative ground-
ing for NA, along with other features of Descartes’ freewill defense, would show 
that (g) and (E) can both be simultaneously true.12
Hence, if Descartes chooses to use STR as part of his hypothetical story, this 
is merely a rhetorical choice.13 By using such a pedagogical aid, Descartes does 
not commit himself to any metaphysical truths at all, not even to the truth 
of any possibility claims. Therefore, even if symmetric frame conditions were 
 appropriate for Cartesian modalities (see n. 9), there would still be nothing 
viciously circular about including STR in his hypothetical story.
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7. Conclusion
Michael Della Rocca’s ‘new circle’ is based on several interpretive claims: (1) while 
attempting to prove the truth rule, Descartes realizes that his premises seem to 
lead to a patently false result – namely that we are infallible. (2) Descartes must 
first solve this puzzle in order to continue his proof of the truth rule. (3) In the 
course of solving this puzzle, Descartes relies on a norm of correct assent (NA). 
And, (4) Descartes grounds NA on the super truth rule (STR) – all and only clear 
and distinct ideas are guaranteed to be true. But, (5) STR is just a strengthened 
version of the truth rule. Thus, Della Rocca infers that by grounding NA in this 
way, Descartes is guilty of premise circularity – he literally uses the truth rule 
to prove itself.
In the refutation above we have intentionally avoided contesting any of Della 
Rocca’s core interpretive claims (1) through (5). Instead, we have shown that 
even granting Della Rocca his reading of Meditation IV, it does not follow that 
Descartes is guilty of premise circularity. The reason, in short, is that the project 
to show that an entailment does not hold is merely the project to show a given 
set is consistent. And this project only requires true claims about the logical 
relations that hold among the members of the set. It requires no commitment 
to truths about reality beyond. Hence, both Della Rocca’s Joe and Susie analogy 
and his modal rejoinder are misplaced, and, Della Rocca has failed to find a new 
instance of circularity in Meditation IV.
Notes
1.  The traditional Cartesian Circle concerns the fact that (i) Descartes suggests that 
he cannot fully trust the ‘truth-rule’ until he first knows that god exists. But (ii) 
it seems he cannot trust the premises of his proof for god’s existence without 
first relying on the truth rule. unlike Della Rocca’s new circle, this is not a case of 
premise circularity.
2.  References to Descartes refer to volume and page numbers from these standard 
editions:
AT Adam and Tannery, 1974–86.
CSM Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch 1984–5.
CSMK Cottingham et al. 1991.
3.  one might wonder whether god’s veracity alone entails the truth rule. We take 
up this question in ‘The Fourth Meditation and Cartesian Circles’ (unpublished 
manuscript). But for our purposes here, Della Rocca’s reading is what matters. 
Note in the passage just quoted: Della Rocca says ‘god is not a deceiver and 
thus does not allow clear and distinct ideas to be false’ (our emphasis). His belief 
in this entailment explains why Della Rocca takes divine veracity and the truth 
rule to both follow from one and the same (Third Meditation) argument, and it 
explains why he suggests that once Descartes has removed doubts about this 
argument, he will have ‘beaten back the skeptic about clear and distinct ideas.’
4.  We take this terminology from Newman (1999, 559–91).
5.  on the same page, he states the same rule a bit more precisely: ‘[W]e should 
assent to clear and distinct ideas and should not assent to non-clear and distinct.’
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6.  N.B. it only follows if ‘chance’ is read as claim of objective, instead of subjective, 
probability. But we shall set this interpretive issue to one side (see: Carriero 2009, 
462–3).
7.  If one wonders about this interpretive claim, note that a probabilistic challenge 
could not throw Descartes’ premises into doubt, for recall that in the Third 
Meditation, he discovered a deductive proof for (g) (cf. Descartes’ formal 
presentation of his argument AT VII 160–70, CSM II 113–20). From an inductive 
challenge, therefore, it would not follow that (g) is false, but only that something 
unlikely (error, in this case) had occurred. Thus, if there is a problem here at all, it 
must be a deductive problem. See Newman (1999) for another argument to the 
effect that the Fourth Meditation problem must be deductive.
8.  Personal correspondence (May 24, 2014).
9.  Della Rocca’s own work on Cartesian modality seems to bear this out (see, 
e.g. 2005, 1–33, 2011, 103–5). Della Rocca argues that the two levels of modal 
discourse in Descartes do not have open accessibility relations to each other. 
But to deny universal accessibility entails denying symmetry. From the absolute 
perspective that considers the omnipotence of god, everything is contingent 
(or everything minus facts about god’s own nature). Whereas, from the more 
restricted perspective of created reality certain truths genuinely necessary – such 
as 2 + 2 = 4. From the absolute perspective, god could have made a different 
eternal truth than 2 + 2 = 4. He could have made 2 + 2 = 4 false and some other 
claim true such as 2 + 2 = 5. Thus, in the absolute sense, there is a possible world 
where 2 + 2 = 5. And in this possible world 2 + 2 = 5 would have been an eternal 
truth, that is to say, it would have been necessary in the restricted sense. Thus, 
if we read ‘◊’ as referring to absolute modality and ‘’ as referring to restricted 
modality, Descartes is saying that ◊(2 + 2 = 5). And this claim is true in the 
actual world. It is true here and now that god could have made different eternal 
truths. yet, the possible world referred to in the expression ◊(2 + 2 = 5) does 
not access the actual world as symmetry requires. For otherwise, we could infer 
that in the actual world both 2 + 2 = 5 and (2 + 2 = 4) are true, which would be 
a contradiction. Thus, we wager, symmetry cannot be attributed to Descartes.
10.  Salient here, e.g. would be (i) the fact that divine benevolence does not entail 
deterministic divine control over every creaturely act, (ii) that manufacturer 
responsibility does not entail responsibility for user errors, and (iii) the goodness 
of the whole of reality does not entail that at a given time slice, for a particular 
sub-section of reality, improvement is impossible.
11.  N.B. Some commentators think that this scenario is Descartes’ actual considered 
view (see, e.g. Carriero 2009, 462 n. 40; Kenny 1972).
12.  In fact, once the pedagogical nature of the story is seen, it becomes clear that 
Descartes need not justify NA at all for the purpose of showing the consistency 
of {(g), (E)}. For that project, NA could be nothing more than an arbitrarily chosen 
fiction and still succeed – at least if blocking (I) is the only argumentative project 
for which Descartes employs NA. It might be objected that Descartes needs NA for 
another project – that of positively establishing the truth rule. one might argue 
that Descartes cannot establish the truth rule without claiming that humans act 
blamelessly (i.e. use their faculty of judgment properly) when they assent to clear 
and distinct perceptions; but Descartes cannot establish that, in turn, without 
putting forward NA as actually true. While this suggestion is not implausible, 
there are reasons to doubt it. As Carriero (2009, 463 n. 40) notes, when Descartes 
finally states the truth rule in the last paragraph of the Fourth Meditation, 
his argument there does not explicitly depend on any claim about how one 
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should (or should not) assent. In ‘The Fourth Meditation and Cartesian Circles’ 
(unpublished manuscript), we explore the question of whether Descartes appeals 
to the actual truth of NA in establishing the truth rule. However, this question 
is not relevant to our refutation of Della Rocca, who gives every appearance of 
holding that the truth rule will follow immediately – without further appeal to 
NA – once Descartes has successfully demonstrated the consistency of {(g), (E)}. 
See note 3 above.
13.  That is to say, if Della Rocca is correct then Descartes may be making a rhetorical 
blunder, but even so he is not making a logical one.
*   Thanks to Michael Della Rocca, lex Newman, the anonymous referees, and the 
audiences at both the 2015 APA Central Division Meeting and the 2014 Midwest 
Conference in Early Modern Philosophy (at uW-Milwaukee) for feedback on earlier 
versions of this paper.
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